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The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is still threatening the world because
of a possible resurgence. In the current situation that effective medical treatments such as antiviral
drugs are not discovered yet, dynamical features of the epidemics should be clarified for establishing
strategies for tracing, quarantine, isolation, and regulating social behavior of the public at appro-
priate costs. Here we propose a network model for SARS epidemics and discuss why superspreaders
emerged and why SARS spread especially in hospitals, which were key factors of the recent out-
break. We suggest that superspreaders are biologically contagious patients, and they may amplify
the spreads by going to potentially contagious places such as hospitals. To avoid mass transmission
in hospitals, it may be a good measure to treat suspected cases without hospitalizing them. Finally,
we indicate that SARS probably propagates in small-world networks associated with human contacts
and that the biological nature of individuals and social group properties are factors more important
than the heterogeneous rates of social contacts among individuals. This is in marked contrast with
epidemics of sexually transmitted diseases or computer viruses to which scale-free network models
often apply.
PACS numbers: 87.23.G, 87.23.C
I. INTRODUCTION
The first case of the recent outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is estimated to
have started in the Guandong province of the People’s Republic of China in November of 2002. After
that, SARS spread to many countries, causing a number of infectious cases. In spite of worldwide
research efforts, the biological mechanism of the SARS infection is not yet fully clarified, which mars
developments of antiviral drugs or other means of conclusive medication. Under this condition, an
effective way was to track everybody suspected to be involved in the spreads and quarantine them,
which is the same as a century ago. However, more effective strategies in terms of safety and cost
could be established with the knowledge of dynamical mechanisms of the outbreak including the
effects of so called superspreaders (SS’s) and spreads in hospitals. Along this line, epidemiological
models that explain the actual and potential transmission patterns can be helpful for suppressing
the spreads. For example, dynamical compartmental models for fully mixed population [1] and for
geographical subpopulations in Hong Kong [2] have been proposed and fitted to the real data, and
they are successful in explaining the real data and determining the basic reproductive number [3].
However, the models contain many compartments and many parameters whose values are determined
manually, which may obscure relative contributions of the factors. Here we rather propose a simplified
spatial model to indicate how interplay between network structure and individual factors affects the
epidemics.
A prominent feature in the SARS epidemics is the dominant influence of SS’s [1, 2, 4]. According
to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a patient is defined to be a SS if he or
she has infected more than 10 people. The SARS epidemics are special in that a majority of cases
originated from just a small number of SS’s. On the other hand, nonsuperspreading patients, which
by far outnumber SS’s, explain only a small portion of the infection events. In Singapore, just 5 SS’s
have infected 80% of about 200 patients, whereas about 80% of the patients have infected nobody
[4, 5, 6]. Also in Hong Kong, one patient caused more than 100 successive cases [2, 6]. Similar key
persons are identified in other parts of the world as well. Also epidemics of Ebola, measles, and
tuberculosis often accompany SS’s [4]. It is believed that SS’s are caused both by biological reasons
such as genetic tendencies, health conditions, and strength of the virus and by social reasons such
2as the manner of social contacts and global structure of social interaction. It agrees with general
understanding that epidemics depend on the personal factors and the structure of social networks
[7, 8]. Although previous dynamical models consider SS’s to be exceptional [2] or do not model them
explicitly [1], we incorporate them as a key factor for the spreading.
Another feature of SARS is rapid spreading in hospitals, which played a pivotal role in, at least, local
outbreaks, sometimes accounting for more than half the total regional cases. The embarrassing fact
that hospitals are actually amplifying diseases [2, 4] should be provided with convincing mechanisms
so that we can reduce the risk of spreads in hospitals and relieve the public of anxieties. To this end
again, we will examine the combined effects of SS’s and the network structure.
Here we construct a dynamical model for SARS spreads, which is simpler than the previous models
[1, 2] but takes into account SS’s and the spatial structure represented by the small-world properties
[9]. We then propose possible means for preventing SARS spreads in the absence of vaccination. The
simulated SARS epidemics are also compared with the epidemics of sexually transmitted diseases
(STD’s) and computer viruses whose mechanism owes much to scale-free properties of the underlying
networks [8, 10, 11, 12].
II. MODEL AND GENERAL THEORY
Our model is composed of n persons located on vertices of a graph. A pair of individuals connected
by an undirected edge directly interact and possibly transmit SARS. We simply assume three types
of individuals: namely, the susceptible, the infected but non-SS’s, and the SS’s. Here a SS, probably
with strong and/or a large amount of viruses, has a strong tendency to infect the susceptible, even
without frequent social contacts. The dynamics is the contact process with three states [12, 13, 14].
A susceptible can be infected by an adjacent patient (a SS or an infected non-SS) at certain rates.
A patient returns to the susceptible state at rate 1, mimicking the recovery from SARS or its death
followed by the local emergence of a new healthy person. The infected non-SS’s and SS’s are modeled
with different rates of infection [3, 8, 14]. An infected turns an adjacent susceptible into infected non-
SS or SS at rate λI(1−p) or λIp, respectively, where p parametrizes the number of SS’s divided by the
number of patients. Similarly, a SS infects an adjacent susceptible into infected non-SS or SS at a rate
λSS(1 − p) or λSSp, respectively [14]. The infected non-SS’s and SS’s do not have direct interactions
even if they are next to each other. However, they interact indirectly owing to the cross-talk rates λIp
and λSS(1− p). These infection events as well as death events at rate 1 happen independently for all
the sites. The parameter values depend on the definition of a SS, the network structure, and the time
scales. With the supposition of total mixing of the individuals and the definition of a SS by CDC, the
data of the outbreak in Singapore [4] provide a rough estimate of p = 0.03. As a rough estimation,
we set λSS/λI = 20 based on the descriptions on a small number of superspreaders identified in
Singapore [4] and Hong Kong [2, 6]. To our knowledge, larger data about the number of cases caused
by each patient or about the detailed chains of transmissions are not available in other regions. A
relevant condition that seemingly holds in the current outbreak is λI < 1 < λSS , where λI and λSS
are multiplied by the number of neighbors for a moment. In this situation, the mean-field theory
predicts the existence of a threshold for p above which the disease spreads widely [14]. The recent
outbreak may have led to a suprathreshold regime even with small p because λSS is presumably huge.
The model studies using real data suggest that the threshold has been crossed from the above by the
control efforts [1, 2].
Next, we introduce the local network structure. At a given time, the whole population is typically
divided into groups within which relatively frequent social contacts are expected. A group represents,
for example, hospital, school, family, market, train, and office, and it is characterized by clustering
properties [9, 15] and dense coupling. We prepare g groups, each containing ng = n/g individuals. The
ith individual (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is connected to randomly chosen ki (0 ≤ ki ≤ ng−1) individuals within the
group. The rate of transmission is proportional to the vertex degree ki in the early stage of epidemics
[3, 12]. Apart from the effects of ki, λI , and λSS , some social groups are more prone to transmit SARS
than others. This group dependence originates in, for example, ventilation, sanitary levels, and the
duration of grouping [1, 2, 5]. The effect is represented by a multiplicative factor Tj for the jth group
(1 ≤ j ≤ g). Then the effective intragroup infection strength is calculated as 〈ki〉j Tj, where 〈· · ·〉j
is the average over i in the jth group. Presumably, social groups such as hospitals, congested trains,
airplanes, and poorly ventilated residences have large 〈ki〉j Tj. For example, hospitals may have large
〈ki〉j Tj because of a high population density yielding large 〈ki〉j and the fact that the susceptible
3hospitalized for other diseases may be generally weak against infectious diseases including SARS. The
influence of trains due to congestion and closedness of the air for long time is a potential source of
outbreaks in the regions where people habitually commutate by congested public transportations, like
Japan. In contrast, 〈ki〉j Tj may be low for groups formed in open spaces. However, we note that
SARS can also break out in low-risk groups if λSS is sufficiently large. For simplicity, we assume that
g0 out of g groups have Tj = Th that is larger than Tj = Tl taken by the other g − g0 groups.
Although many models ignore the spatial structure of the population and rely on meanfield descrip-
tions [1, 3], spatial aspects should be incorporated for understanding the real dynamics of epidemics
[2, 7, 8, 16]. Mainstream from this standpoint are methods of percolation and the contact process
on regular lattices [13, 14, 17]. However, d-dimensional lattices have characteristic path length L —
that is, the mean distance between a pair of vertices — proportional to n1/d. In social networks,
L is approximately proportional to log n as in random graphs [9]. To cope with this observation,
we introduce random recombination of n individuals into g new groups. In reality, one belongs to
many groups that dynamically break and reform more or less randomly by way of social activities
[7, 18]. For example, one may commute to one’s workplace and return home everyday, possibly by
changing trains, which serve as temporary social groups as well. After time t0, we randomly shuffle
all the vertices and reorganize them into g groups and wire the vertices within each group in the same
manner as before. Then the epidemic dynamics is run for another t0 before next shuffling occurs. For
simplicity, just two independent groupings are assumed to alternate, as schematically shown in Fig. 1.
However, the results are easily extended to the case of longer chains of group reformation. Owing to
the shuffling, individuals initially belonging to different groups can interact in the long run.
We denote xα,I and xα,SS the number of the infected non-SS’s and that of the SS’s summed over
the groups with Tj = Tα (α = h, l). In the early stages of epidemics, the dynamics between two
switching events is given by the meanfield description as follows:
d
dt
(
xh,SS
xh,I
xl,SS
xl,I
)
=


λSSp
〈
ki
〉
h
Th − 1 λIp
〈
ki
〉
h
Th 0 0
λSS(1 − p)
〈
ki
〉
h
Th λI (1 − p)
〈
ki
〉
h
Th − 1 0 0
0 0 λSSp
〈
ki
〉
l
Tl − 1 λIp
〈
ki
〉
l
Tl
0 0 λSS(1 − p)
〈
ki
〉
l
Tl λI (1 − p)
〈
ki
〉
l
Tl − 1


(
xh,SS
xh,I
xl,SS
xl,I
)
,
(1)
where 〈· · ·〉α denotes averaging over the groups with Tj = Tα. The random shuffling is expressed by
multiplication of the following matrix from the left:

g0
g + σ 0
g0
g + σ 0
0 g0g + σ 0
g0
g + σ
g−g0
g − σ 0
g−g0
g − σ 0
0 g−g0g − σ 0
g−g0
g − σ

 , (2)
where σ is the possible correlation factor specifying the tendency for patients to join groups with
〈ki〉j Tj = 〈ki〉h Th. Purely random mixing yields σ = 0. The map for the one-round dynamics
comprising the contact process for time t0 followed by switching has eigenvalues 0, 0, e
−t0 ∼= 1 − t0,
and
(
g0
g
+ σ)e(−1+Th〈ki〉h(λI (1−p)+λSSp))t0 + (
g − g0
g
− σ)e(−1+Tl〈ki〉l(λI(1−p)+λSSp))t0
∼= 1 +
{[(
g0
g
+ σ
)
Th 〈ki〉h +
(
g − g0
g
− σ
)
Tl 〈ki〉l
]
[λI(1 − p) + λSSp]− 1
}
t0
for t0 small with respect to the system time t introduced in Eq. (1). An important indicator of
outbreaks is the basic reproductive number R0 defined as the mean number of secondary infections
produced by a single patient in a susceptible population [1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 19]. If R0 exceeds unity, the
disease spreads on average in mixed populations such as the local groups in Fig. 1. Since R0 equals
the largest eigenvalue, what matters is whether[
(
g0
g
+ σ)Th 〈ki〉h + (
g − g0
g
− σ)Tl 〈ki〉l
]
[λI(1 − p) + λSSp] (3)
is greater than 1. As a result, multiple kinds of heterogeneities [3] — namely, the factors associated
with individual patients and those specific to the groups — interact and determine the tendency to
4spread. Generally speaking, a positive σ raises R0. Even if both factors are subthreshold in the
absence of σ, that is (
g0
g
Th
〈ki〉h
〈ki〉
+
g − g0
g
Tl
〈ki〉l
〈ki〉
)
< 1 (4)
and [λI(1 − p) + λSSp] 〈ki〉 < 1, a positive σ can make the whole dynamics suprathreshold. In actual
SARS spreads in hospitals; σ > 0 seems to have held; compared with healthy people, the SARS patients
and the suspected are obviously more likely to go to hospital where Tj and 〈ki〉j are supposedly high.
Currently, we do not have control over infection rates of individuals, particularly λSS [2]. However,
the threat of spreads may be decreased if their behavior is altered so that they avoid risky places. It
is recommended that they be seen by doctor at home or some isolated sites. The strategies applied in
many countries such as introducing more separated hospital rooms, making doctors and nurses work
in a single ward [20], and ordering the public to stay home also decrease ki and σ [2].
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We next examine effects of network structure by numerical simulations. To focus on topological
factors, we simply set Th = Tl = 1 and ki = k = ng − 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The group size ng, which
is typically somewhat smaller than 100 [18], is chosen to be 81 = 92 for technical reasons, although
the value really relevant to the SARS epidemics is not known [1]. With g = 100, n = gng = 90
2,
and t0 = 0.5, the chains of infection after the total run time t = 1.0, from the viewpoint of two
different groupings as in Fig. 1, are shown in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b). They more or less reproduce the
transmission pattern of SARS in Singapore [4], including the rapid spreads mediated by small L and
the massive influence of SS’s (solid lines). The transmission naturally spreads over time, as shown in
Fig. 2(c) corresponding to t = 2.0. By comparing Fig. 2(c) with Fig. 2(d), which shows the results
for t = 2.0 and t0 = 1.0, we find that local transmission develops if the time spent with a fixed group
configuration is relatively longer.
More quantitatively, Fig. 3(a) shows, for t = 2.0 and t0 = 0.5, the distributions of ai, which is the
number of people to whom the ith patient has directly infected. The patients with large ai are mostly
SS’s. Small ai is chiefly covered by other patients, and the distribution decays exponentially in ai
within this range. The homogeneous vertex degree and the Poisso´n property of the processes caused
the exponential tail, which is preserved in small-world-type networks like ours and random graphs [9]
where the vertex degrees obey narrow distributions.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Comparison with regular lattices
A time course of chains of infection in a two-dimensional square lattice are shown in Figs. 2(e),
2(f), and 2(g), with n, g, and ki, and the duration of the run the same as before. We assume the
periodic boundary conditions, and ki = 80 neighbors of a vertex (x,y) (1 ≤ x, y ≤ 90) are defined
to be the vertices included in the square with center (x,y) and side length 9. The infection pattern
appears similar to Figs. 2(a)-2(d) if we ignore the underlying space. However, large L, or the lack
of global interactions, permits the disease to spread only linearly in time [13]. This contrasts with a
small-world type of networks and fully mixed networks like random graphs in which diseases spread
exponentially fast in the beginning [3, 21]. Accordingly, the transmission is by far slower than shown in
Figs. 2(a)-2(d). Although propagations at linear rates would be good approximation before long-range
transportations had become readily available, they do not match the recent spreads mediated by long-
distance travelers that lessen L [2, 6, 9, 19]. Taken in another way, restrictions on long movements
can be a useful spread control [2]. By the same token, mathematical approaches such as percolations
and contact processes on regular lattices, which often yield valuable rigorous results [13, 14, 17], are
subject to this caveat.
5B. Comparison with Scale-free Networks
Another candidate for the network architecture is scale-free networks whose distributions of ki
obey the power laws [10]. Compared with the class of small-world networks [9], scale-free networks,
particularly with the original construction algorithm, lack the clustering property, whereas they realize
the power law often present in nature [15]. The chains of infection in a scale-free network with the
mean vertex degree equal to the previous simulations are shown in Figs. 2(h) and 2(i) for t = 1.0 and
t = 2.0, respectively. Compared with the case of our transmission model [see Figs. 2(a)-2(d)], the
influence of SS’s is more magnified. Figure 3(b), plotting the distributions of ai for t = 2.0, shows
that the distribution of ai decays with a power law rather than exponentially for small ai. When more
extensive data become available, we will be able to fit Fig. 3(a) or 3(b) to the real data as shown in
Fig. 3(c) and gain more insights into the real epidemics, based on the distributions of ai. Figure 3
also suggests that more patients in total result from the epidemics in scale-free networks than in our
model network, even though the mean transmission rate and the mean vertex degree are the same.
In Fig. 4, we plot (ki, ai) for each subpopulation of the susceptible (ai = 0), the infected non-SS’s,
and the SS’s. For the infected non-SS’s and SS’s, ai is roughly proportional to ki. This explains
the power-law tail in Fig. 3(b) and enables the existence of extremely contagious SS’s that could be
called ultrasuperspreaders. The scale-free property implies highly heterogeneous distribution of ki.
Compared with the same size of regular, small-world, or random networks whose ki’s are relatively
homogeneous, scale-free networks have larger R0 ∝
〈
k2i
〉
/ 〈ki〉 [3, 8, 12, 16]. In percolation models,
R0 =
∑n
i=0 ki(ki−1)λi, where λi denotes the rate of possible transmission from the ith individual [8].
Consequently, in the original scale-free networks whose density function of ki is proportional to k
−3
i ,
the critical value present for regular, small-world, or random networks of the same mean edge density
is extinguished [8]. The same is true for dynamical models such as contact processes [12]. Accordingly,
scale-free networks spread diseases even with infinitesimally small infection rates. Furthermore, if a
positive critical value exists with the type of scale-free networks whose distribution of ki follows k
γ
i
(γ < −3), a tendency that SS’s occupy vertices with large ki can remove the critical values. For
example, the critical infection rate shrinks to 0 if λi ∝ k
γ′
i with γ
′ > −γ − 3.
Does this mechanism underlie the current and possible spreading of SARS? We think not, first
because SS’s do not necessarily seem to prefer to inhabit hubs of networks. Even without such
correlation, heterogeneous infection strengths of patients are not probably determined by the highly
heterogeneous ki. A major route for SARS transmission is daily personal contacts. In this respect,
distributions of ki of acquaintance networks and friendship networks do not follow power laws, but
have exponential tails because of aging of individuals and their limited capacity [15, 16]. Particularly,
the number of contacts per day is limited by the time and energy of a person, which flattens the
distribution of ki; SS’s of SARS seem to lead ordinary social lives. SS’s possibly result from the
combination of large λi and the stay in groups with large 〈ki〉j Tj, as has been discussed in this paper.
Scale-free networks are rather relevant to spreads of computer viruses and STD’s [11, 12, 16, 19].
Spreads are mostly mediated by individuals on hubs in such epidemics, and ultrasuperspreaders may
result as a combination of large λi and large ki [3, 19]. Preventive efforts to target active patients with
large ki are effective in these diseases [8]. However, efforts to suppress SARS should be invested in
identifying the patients with large λi and places with large 〈ki〉j Tj, rather than in looking for socially
active persons that exist only with probability exponentially small in ki.
C. Effects of clustering
A bonus of using a small-world type of networks is that they are clustered, as measured by the
cluster coefficient C [9]. In real situations, the probability that two patients directly infected by the
same patient know each other is significantly high. Also from this viewpoint, small-world networks
are more relevant than networks with small C such as scale-free networks or random graphs. We
have used the network shown in Fig. 1 instead of the model by Watts and Strogatz [9] to facilitate
analysis and comprehensive understanding of the dynamics. With edges appearing in different timings
superimposed, C ∼= 〈ki〉 /ngc where c is the number of random groupings (c = 2 in our simulations),
whereas L ∝ log n. If ki is the order of ng and c is not so large, our network has small-world properties
characterized by large C and small L.
The notion of clustering might induce one to imagine situations in which people congregate and
6SARS spreads. However, infection occurs only on the boundaries between a susceptible and a patient,
and propagation slows if a pair of the infected face each other as typically happens in highly clustered
networks. An increase in C rather elevates the epidemic threshold in site percolations [21, 22], bond
percolations [8, 22], and contact processes [7, 9, 13]. It also decreases the final size of the infected
population or spreads in late stages [7, 9]. In spite of these general effects of C, however, we claim
that C does not count in the outbreak of SARS. The possibility of outbreaks and dynamics in initial
stages are determined by other factors such as λi, ki, Tj , and σ. If the ith individual that happens
to be a patient has k neighboring patients, the effective ki decreases to ki − k. However, k is tiny
relative to ki in early stages even if C is large. On the other hand, clustering in the sense of large C
indirectly promotes the spreads by increasing k. The arguments above on the effects of C are based on
varying C with k fixed. However, the population density of a group concurrently modulates k and C
[3]. In a group of ng people with spatial size Sg, 〈ki〉 = (ng− 1)Sp/Sg, where Sp is the size of personal
space within which each person randomly interacts with others. Obviously, 〈ki〉 is proportional to
the population density ng/Sg. In addition, C = Sp/Sg ∝ 〈ki〉 even for a fully mixed population.
Therefore, the concept of clustering related to the SARS spreads is high population density. The
network with large C has been applied in this paper to respect the social reality.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a dynamic network model for SARS epidemics and shown that com-
bined effects of superspreaders and their possible tendencies to haunt potentially contagious places can
amplify the spreads. In addition, we have contrasted the different dynamical consequences according
to different types of underlying network structure.
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Figure captions
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the dynamic network for ng = 4 and g = 4. The vertices initially
form random graphs within each group. After time t0, they are randomly shuffled to reform new
groups. The graph switches between the two configurations with period t0.
Figure 2: Chains of infection in the dynamical small-world network (a), (b), (c), (d), the two-
dimensional regular lattice (e), (f), (g), and the scale-free network (h), (i). Transmissions from the
infected non-SS’s and those from SS’s are shown by dashed and solid lines, respectively. We set
n = 902, ng = 81, g = 100, λI = 0.026, λSS = 0.52, k = 80, and the time step ∆t = 0.05. We set
t0 = 0.5 and t = 1.0 in (a), (b), t0 = 0.5 and t = 2.0 in (c), t0 = 1.0 and t = 2.0 in (d), t = 1.0 in (e),
(h), t = 2.0 in (f), (i), and t = 3.0 in (g). (a) and (b) correspond to the two groupings shown in Fig. 1.
In (e), (f), (g), a square lattice with 90× 90 vertices are used, and k = 80. In (h), (i), the scale-free
network with k = 80 and n = 902 is generated by starting with a complete graph of 40 vertices and
adding n− 40 vertices. Each vertex is endowed with 40 new edges whose destinations are determined
according to preferential attachment [10].
Figure 3: Distributions of ai — namely, the number of individuals to whom a patient has directly
infected — in (a) the dynamical small-world network, (b) the scale-free network, and (c) Singapore
[4]. The distributions are shown for the SS’s (crosses) and all the patients (circles). We set t = 2.0 in
(a), (b) and t0 = 0.5 in (a).
Figure 4: Relation between the vertex degree ki and the number of infections, ai, in the scale-free
network for the susceptible (squares), the infected non-SS’s (crosses), and the SS’sars.tex: main text
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